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PAMPHLETS ON

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1. Altamira y Crevea, Rafael. The Share of Spain in the history of the Pacific Ocean. 1917
2. Bagley, Clarence B. The Waterways of the Pacific Northwest. 1917
3. Balch, Thomas Willing. The Alasko-Canadian frontier. 1902.
4. Bolton, Herbert E. The Early explorations of Father Garcés on the Pacific Slope. 1917
5. Bolton, Herbert E. New light on Manuel Lisa and the Spanish fur trade.
6. Dunning, William A. Paying for Alaska, 1912.
7. Howay, F. W. The Fur trade in northwestern development. 1917
8. Morrow, William W. "The Spoilers". 1916

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JOHN ROBERT COOPER

ALABAMA

ALABAMA

ALABAMA

1. Adams & Brown, 1917.
The State of Alabama in the
History of the United States
1917.
2. Barry, George E. The
History of the Pacific
Northwest, 1917.
3. Barry, George E. The
History of the Pacific
Northwest, 1917.
4. Barry, George E. The
History of the Pacific
Northwest, 1917.
5. Barry, George E. The
History of the Pacific
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6. Barry, George E. The
History of the Pacific
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7. Barry, George E. The
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8. Barry, George E. The
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9. Barry, George E. The
History of the Pacific
Northwest, 1917.

ALABAMA

9. Stephens, Henry Morse. The
Conflict of European
nations in the Pacific.
1917
10. Teggart, Frederick J. The
Approaches to the Pacific
Coast. 1915

PAYING FOR ALASKA

Some Unfamiliar Incidents in the Process

BY

WILLIAM A. DUNNING

REPRINTED FROM POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

VOL. XXVII, No. 3

NEW YORK

PUBLISHED BY GINN & COMPANY

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SOME UNFAMILIAR INCIDENTS IN THE PROCESS

EARLY September in the District of Columbia is usually hot and oppressive, and statesmen whose duties keep them in Washington find excursions into the surrounding country indispensable to health and comfort. The year 1868 and the statesmen then in charge of the government were no exceptions to this rule. Thus it happened that two high officials of the administration took an outing together one day. The incidents of their expedition were doubtless for the most part utterly commonplace, and no record of them has remained. A single episode, however, made so deep an impression on one of the picknickers that, on his return home, he penciled an account of it on a sheet of notepaper and laid it aside for future reference. There is no evidence that he ever referred to the memorandum, and it appears to have lain unnoticed among his papers for thirty-seven years. In 1905 a browsing student of history happened upon it and was struck by the light that the paper threw on certain generally forgotten incidents of the time. The memorandum, precisely as written save that a few unimportant doubts about orthography are resolved in favor of the writer, is as follows:

On the 6th Sept Sundy 1868 Mr. Seward and myself rode out some seven or eight miles on the Road leading to Malsboro Md—near place called old fields, we drove out into a shady grove of oak trees—While there taking some refreshment, in the current of conversation on various subjects, the Secretary asked the question if it it had ever occurred to me how few members there were in congress whose actions were entirely

above and beyond pecuniary influence. I replied that I had never attempted to reduce it to an accurate calculation, but regretted to confess that there was a much smaller number exempt than at one period of life I had supposed them to be—He then stated you remember that the appropriation of the seven \$ million for the payment of Alaska to the Russia Govnt was hung up or brought to a dead lock in the H of Reps—While the appropriation was thus delayed the Russian minister stated to me that John W. Forney stated to him that he needed \$30,000 that he had lost \$40,000, by a faithless friend and that he wanted the \$30,000 in gold—That there was no chance of the appropriation passing the House of Reps without certain influence was brought to bear in its favor—The 30,000 was paid hence the advocacy of the appropriation in the Chronicle—He also stated that \$20,000 was paid to R. J. Walker and F. P. Stanton for their services—N P Banks chairman of the committee on foreign relations \$8000, and that the incorruptable Thaddeous Stevens received as his '*soy*' the moderate sum of \$10,000—All these sums were paid by the Russian minister directly and indirectly to the respective parties to secure appropriation of money the Govnt had stiputed to pay the Russian Govnt in solemn treaty which had been ratified by both Govmts.—

Banks and Stevens was understood to be the counsel for a claim against the Russian Govnt for Arms which had been furnished by some of our citizens—known as the Perkins Claim—Hence a fee for their influence in favor of the appropriation &c—Banks was chairman of the Committee on foreign retions—

No patriotic citizen of the United States can read the above lines without a feeling of shame and a sense of the indignation that manifestly burned in the writer. On the other hand, no one familiar with the politics of the time will fail to realize the very human if somewhat malicious satisfaction with which the references to John W. Forney and "the incorruptable Thaddeous Stevens" were set down; for these two men had for two years been most ruthless assailants of the administration, and the writer of the memorandum was no less a personage than Andrew Johnson, president of the United States.

While the first impression produced by reading the memorandum is the discouraging one that our acquisition of Alaska was tainted by corruption, a little reflection shows that the case

is not at all clear. This account of what happened is, in the first place, but hearsay in the second degree: it is Johnson's account of Seward's report of what Stoeckl, the Russian minister, said. That Johnson set down as exactly as he could remember what Seward said, seems beyond doubt from the very circumstances of the case. The memorandum, though undated, bears evidence of having been made on the day of the conversation or shortly thereafter.¹ Seward's talk with Stoeckl, however, must have been many weeks, if not several months, in the past when it was reported to Johnson; and, moreover, Seward was notoriously prone to narrative and reminiscence that were more conspicuous for picturesqueness than for strict accuracy. Especially characteristic was this of Seward when the cheering cup was in circulation; and it is to be noted that, according to the memorandum, the conversation with Johnson took place while the two were partaking of "refreshment," which may have included liquids. There is room, thus, for doubt as to the details of Seward's story, though not, I think, as to its general features. There remains, of course, room for question as to whether Stoeckl told the truth to Seward. On several of these matters of uncertainty some light is thrown by circumstances antecedent or subsequent to September, 1868, that are part of recorded history. On the other hand, some of these circumstances assume a very entertaining aspect in view of the hitherto unknown memorandum.

Before taking up these historical matters, it should be pointed out that of the recipients of the Russian's bounty named in the memorandum only two were actually in the service of the government. General N. P. Banks was chairman of the House committee on foreign affairs, and Thaddeus Stevens, who died August 11, less than a month before the conversation between

¹ How deeply impressed the president was by Seward's story is suggested by the very fact that he wrote down the account of it with his own hand. As was well known to his intimates, writing was a most difficult operation to Mr. Johnson. This was due, not, as his enemies often said, to his illiteracy, but to the fact that the muscles of his arm had been seriously injured some years before he became president. Among the papers of his presidential term preserved in the Library of Congress there are very few examples of his own handwriting, and among the few there is not one more lengthy than the memorandum under consideration.

Seward and Johnson, was chairman of the committee on appropriations and leader of the majority. These two influential men could not have accepted money from the Russian minister save for reasons that could not bear the light of day. Of the other persons named, Robert J. Walker and Frederick P. Stanton were well-known lawyers of Washington, both formerly in the public service, Walker having been secretary of the treasury under Polk. The other man named in the memorandum, John W. Forney, was proprietor of two newspapers, the *Washington Chronicle* and the *Philadelphia Press*. He had been secretary of the Senate till June 4, 1868. Forney's course in relation to public affairs had created a widespread impression that the editorial attitude of his papers was not determined always and exclusively by considerations of abstract righteousness. President Johnson himself had contributed something to confirm this impression by making public a letter in which Forney, in urging a certain course respecting policy and patronage, had very suggestively called the president's attention to the influence of "my two newspapers, both daily."

Let us now see what the precise status of the Alaska question was on the sultry Sunday when Seward and Johnson talked it over. The treaty of purchase had been formally signed by Seward and Stoeckl March 30, 1867. The opposition to ratification was but slight in the Senate, and the treaty, duly ratified, was proclaimed in force June 20, 1867. Shortly afterward, on July 6, 1867, it was laid before Congress by the president, with the request for an appropriation of the purchase price, \$7,200,000 in gold. There was no expectation that the measure would be passed immediately; for, regardless of other reasons, the majority was absorbed in the conflict with Johnson over the process of reconstruction in the South. The administration, however, assuming that the cession was complete upon the promulgation of the treaty, proceeded to take possession of the new territory. On October 11, 1867, the Russian officials formally transferred Alaska to General Rousseau, who had been sent by the president to receive it. Thus, when Congress resumed its work in November, Russia's obligations under the treaty were fully discharged, but the American *quid pro quo* had

not been rendered. Nor was it entirely certain that the payment for the new territory would be forthcoming. Evidence promptly appeared in the House of Representatives of a vigorous opposition to the necessary appropriation. Various resolutions were introduced expressing not only the opinion that Alaska was not worth the price agreed upon and that the treasury could not in any case afford so large an outlay, but also a feeling of resentment at the procedure of the administration in hastening to take possession of the territory and endeavoring thus to coerce the House into accepting the purchase as a *fait accompli*. Shortly after the Christmas recess, Congress became absorbed in the fierce politics of the impeachment of the president. While the passions of this episode dominated the majority in Congress, the most elementary dictates of practical wisdom would deter the friends of the Alaska appropriation from bringing it forward; for one influence in creating opposition to it was a blind hatred on the part of many Radicals toward any policy or any measure that might reflect credit on Johnson and Seward. Not until May 18 was a bill making the appropriation reported from the committee on foreign affairs by its chairman, General Banks. Six weeks more elapsed before the bill was considered. On June 30 the debate opened in the House, and after two weeks of sharp discussion the bill was passed July 14, by a vote of 113 to 43. The Senate gave but little time or attention to the bill, having threshed out the subject when the treaty was before it, and the bill became law on July 27, just as the session of Congress ended, and six weeks prior to Seward's conversation with Johnson.

In the record of the slow progress of the bill various items in this conversation find illumination. The statement in the memorandum that the appropriation was "hung up or brought to a deadlock" in the House obviously refers to the period of inaction prior to May, 1868. During this period Forney's papers gave steady and strong support to the acquisition of Alaska, although in every other respect they went to the utmost extreme of antagonism to Johnson. It was indeed the virulence with which they assailed the senators who voted to acquit the president that led to Forney's not wholly voluntary resignation as

secretary of the Senate, May 12. During the debate on the bill it was freely intimated, by allusions to "mercenary editors," that financial reasons were behind the support that Forney's *Chronicle* and other papers gave to the appropriation.

The attitude of Thaddeus Stevens toward the appropriation was hardly less surprising than Forney's. No more vindictive adversary of Andrew Johnson had appeared than this old man, who, though struck with mortal illness, strained his declining forces to the very end of the session to retrieve in some way the failure to drive Johnson from the White House. Yet on the appropriation for Alaska Stevens gave his voice, with the full force of his magisterial manner, in support of the administration's measure. He may of course have been influenced solely by a conviction that the measure was a good one; or he may have regarded it as Seward's rather than Johnson's, and thus entitled to consideration in memory of the old Whig and anti-slavery days. There is evidence in the Johnson Papers that Stevens never ceased to feel a certain sympathetic relation to Seward that he felt toward no other of Johnson's advisers. In view of this fact, it is rather sad to realize that Seward should have been responsible for making public the suggestion that Stevens's support of the Alaska bill was paid for.

It is explained in the memorandum that the participation of Banks and Stevens in the Russian minister's bounty was due to their connection with the "Perkins claim." The intimation apparently is that they were bribed to abandon the attitude of hostility to Russia that their connection with this claim was assumed to make natural. There is thus a particularly unpleasant reflection upon the character of the two men; for it is implied that they were corrupt not only in their public capacity but also in relation to their private clients. This Perkins claim was well known in Washington. Indeed, it appears from time to time through thirty years of our history. During the Crimean War arms were furnished to the Russian government by an American named Perkins, who claimed that he was not paid for them. He, and after his death his widow, sought to get the government of the United States to take up the case. Secretary Cass and Secretary Seward both considered the claim

with attention, but without decisive outcome. It figured afterward in the affair that resulted in the dismissal of Catacazy, Stoeckl's successor, by Secretary Fish; and it received its quietus only in 1885, by adverse action in Congress.

That this Perkins claim was depended upon by the opposition in antagonizing the Alaska appropriation was revealed in the debate on the bill. Ben. Butler was one of the most determined adversaries of the bill, and his principal speech included an indignant and almost tearful demand that, before so large an amount of money were sent to Russia, that government should be obliged to pay the just claims of American widows and orphans. He moved an amendment providing that \$500,000 of the amount due should be retained to satisfy such claims. No one in Congress was likely to be much affected by Butler's emotion concerning the widows and orphans. All the initiated must have understood that his amendment was but an incident in that operation known in political dialectics as putting an adversary in a hole. If, as the Johnson memorandum alleges, General Banks was associated with the Perkins claim, Butler's amendment was a rather awkward thing for Banks to handle. It would be a demonstration in favor of his clients, but would inevitably kill the appropriation bill that was in his charge. He evaded the trap with success, if not with grace, by objecting to the amendment as not germane, "without expressing any opinion in regard to the subject matter." His point of order was sustained.

The passage of the appropriation bill and the adjournment of Congress by no means ended the incidents bearing on the subject matter of Seward's conversation with Johnson. Indeed the most interesting revelations were yet to come. There were mighty muckrakers in the land before a successor of Andrew Johnson gave its name to the tribe. They flourished greatly in Washington in 1868, and before Congress reassembled in December they had accumulated an imposing mass of their dainty commodity in connection with the Alaska bill. The beginning was the discovery that, while the sum paid Russia was \$7,200,000 in gold, the draft transmitted abroad was for a less sum. A report from London asserted that the face of the draft as it

passed through that financial center was only \$5,000,000. This would leave a tidy \$2,200,000 unaccounted for, and rumor became busy answering the question: Who got it? The answers, for the most part not at once published, ranged over a startling field, both as to persons and amounts. Seward was credited with \$250,000; Banks was put down for the same amount; a number of other Congressmen were on the list; and all the leading newspaper correspondents in Washington were included among the alleged recipients of the Russian bounty. Early in December, just before Congress assembled, an article was published in the Worcester *Spy* embodying the bulk of these scandalous reports. Naturally the House of Representatives ordered an investigation, which was duly carried on by the committee on public expenditures. The results were admitted by the committee in its report¹ to be scanty and unsatisfactory. Chiefly responsible for this was the fact, reported and regretted by the committee, that the Russian legation failed to embrace the opportunity tendered to it by the committee of making a statement concerning the matter under investigation. It is not hard to understand, with Johnson's memorandum before us, some of the probable reasons why the legation did not avail itself of this opportunity. The memorandum enables the present reader of the testimony to get much more satisfaction, or at least entertainment, out of it than was got by the committee that took it. Let us consider some points.

In the first place it was easily proved that the amount of money transmitted abroad was actually less than the total payment by the United States. The discrepancy was, however, nothing like what had been reported. The full amount of the appropriation, \$7,200,000, was paid by the Treasury to M. Stoeckl, but he sent abroad only \$7,035,000, less the bank's commission. The remainder, \$165,000, was deposited with the bank to the credit of the minister. Of this sum \$26,000 was paid to Robert J. Walker, and the rest was paid to the minister in various amounts between August 1 and September 16, 1868. What M. Stoeckl did with all of this \$139,000, the committee

¹ H. R. Reports of Committees, Fortieth Congress, Third Session, no. 35.

was unable to ascertain. A paltry \$4000 was all that could be traced. Of this, \$3000 in gold was paid to a brother of John W. Forney, under circumstances to be mentioned later, and \$1000 in greenbacks went to a California newspaper man named Noah, in recognition of his voluntary services in furnishing information about Alaska. There thus remained \$135,000 unaccounted for. Several witnesses testified as to Stoeckl's complaints about the excessive cost of telegraphing to his government; whether this and other like expenses absorbed the whole of the amount in question must be unknown. It would not be utterly irrational, however, to believe that there was a sufficient margin in this sum to cover comfortably the \$68,000 referred to in the Johnson memorandum. Nor is it without interest to reflect that, if this money was distributed out of the funds on deposit from August 1 to September 16, the process of distribution was going on at the very time when Seward reported the affair to Johnson. The secretary may have been aware of the operation, in which case the course taken by the current of conversation, when the eminent picknickers were refreshing themselves on that hot Sunday, is easily explicable.

As regards the relation of Walker, Stanton and Forney to the Alaska bill, the testimony before the committee is very suggestive when compared with the memorandum. The \$20,000 mentioned in the latter as paid to Walker and Stanton proves to be the amount specified as the fee of Walker when he was employed by Stoeckl as counsel to press the bill. Eventually Walker received \$26,000 in gold, out of which he paid Stanton \$5000 in greenbacks for services rendered. The services of the two lawyers, as described by themselves, took the form of conversations with congressmen and contributions to the press. Banks and Stevens were among the congressmen conversed with, but details of the conversations were not given. The testimony of Walker and Stanton inevitably suggested that they were exceedingly well paid for very little work, and explained the rumors that Walker was the intermediary through whom money went to congressmen and newspapers. But both lawyers denied in the most absolute form all knowledge of payments to public officials. Walker stated that Stoeckl retained

him some time in the first part of May; that the minister was in a state of great anxiety lest the session should close without any appropriation, in which case bad feeling would be created between the two governments. Whether the activity of Walker in stirring up congressmen was the cause or not, it was the fact, as we have seen, that the committee's report in favor of the appropriation was presented by General Banks on May 18, just after that activity began.

As to Forney, the testimony of Walker furnishes a most edifying commentary on the memorandum. The *Chronicle*, Forney's Washington paper, was used very freely by Walker and Stanton in their efforts to "accelerate public opinion" in favor of the appropriation. So hospitable were its columns, editorial and other, to matter favoring the cause that, when the bill was passed, Walker expressed to Stoeckl his warm appreciation of Forney's patriotic conduct and suggested that some compensation for the use of the *Chronicle's* space would be eminently proper. Thereupon the minister authorized him to give Colonel Forney \$3000 in gold. On undertaking to carry out this generous project, Walker was met by scruples on Forney's part about accepting the money. The editor conceded that he was under no legal or moral obligation to refuse it, for he was not now in public office, and his support of the bill had been given without any promise or expectation of reward. But he felt that the position that he unofficially occupied before the people raised considerations of the most delicate propriety that he could not disregard. These noble sentiments, for which Walker did not conceal his admiration, prevailed to the extent that Forney did not take the money; but the vigilance of the editor against the slightest taint of impropriety seems to have relaxed immediately afterward; for when the \$3000 was offered to D. C. Forney, a junior partner in the *Chronicle*, it was accepted with no recorded objection.

This story of Walker's about Forney's relation to the Alaska bill is very different from that given in the memorandum. According to the one, the editor, while he was still a public official and the legislation was still pending, demanded \$30,000 and accepted it. According to the other, the editor, no longer a

public official, and after the bill had passed, refused an unsolicited \$3000. It is barely possible that the story recorded in the memorandum is a garbled and distorted version of the transaction described by Walker. The indications, however, are all to the contrary. Forney's energetic advocacy of the appropriation began as far back as January, 1868, when the first evidence of hostility was appearing in the House. Here was apparently the first fruit of the arrangement between Forney and Stoeckl, as recorded in the memorandum. When Walker, four months later, came into the case, he was quite overcome by the readiness with which the *Chronicle* extended its aid to his cause. His proposition to reward Forney put Stoeckl in an awkward position; for the minister was unwilling to reveal that the *Chronicle's* services had long since been contracted for. Accordingly Walker was permitted to carry out his project, with the result narrated to the committee. In short, both the story in the memorandum and the story of Walker appear to be true. If such is the case, history will long be searched in vain for a more inspiring act of civic virtue than that of Forney. With stoic firmness in his soul and the Russian's \$30,000 in his pocket, he spurned the proffered \$3000 and crowned his lofty renunciation by passing the paltry gold on to his partner.

One other bit of testimony before the investigating committee assumes an aspect to the reader of the memorandum that it could not have presented to the committee. Secretary Seward appeared and testified on December 19, 1868. The chief matter in which he displayed interest was the allegation that the Department of State had spent much public money in subsidizing the press and in other devices for creating opinion favorable to the Alaska purchase. This charge he roundly denied, declaring that he had paid some trifling sums in circulating a speech of Sumner's and a newspaper article by Walker, but that the total expenditure of the State Department, direct and indirect, in connection with the acquisition of Alaska, did not exceed \$500. On this matter of expenditure by the State Department Seward was so exuberantly positive and loquacious as to create the suspicion, in one who has read the memorandum, that the secretary was unconsciously manifesting relief from the

pressure which a preceding question by the committee must have put on him. After describing the requisition that he had officially made upon the secretary of the treasury for a warrant for \$7,200,000 in favor of Stoeckl, Seward continued:

I assume, upon general information, that the money was paid. I do not know when it was paid out of the treasury, nor to whom it was paid. Q. Or of its distribution afterwards?

A. Nothing of its distribution. I know nothing whatever of the use the Russian minister made of the fund. I know of no payment to anybody, by him, or of any application of the funds which he received.

Now the Secretary, being an astute and experienced lawyer and diplomatist, could doubtless have reconciled this statement of December 19 with the statement of September 6 as recorded in Johnson's memorandum; but it was probably regarded as a great mercy by Mr. Seward that he was not required to effect this reconciliation.

A further contribution by the secretary of state to the committee's information was as follows:

I do not know *from Mr. Walker* that he was ever paid a cent; I never paid him a cent. But I remember hearing the Russian minister speak in terms of thankfulness and appreciation of his efforts. . . . That is all I know about Mr. Walker. I do not know that he ever had \$25,000, never heard *from him* that he was to have it, and I know nothing about it now.

The words that I have italicized indicate that at this point in his testimony Mr. Seward's wits were in full action. He obviously had not forgotten all that he had known on September 6 about Mr. Walker and his finances, but it was literally true that that knowledge had not been derived "*from Mr. Walker,*" and that there was no question of "\$25,000," but only, as Johnson recorded, of \$20,000.

Immediately after this non-illuminating testimony, the witness was confronted with this question:

Have you any knowledge of any money or presents, directly or indirectly, being made from the fund at the disposal of the Secretary of

State, or any other fund, to subsidize or propitiate the press, or any person connected therewith, anywhere?

Mr. Seward caught this question with marked eagerness and volubility: "On the contrary," he broke in, "I have knowledge that no fund at the State Department went to subsidize any press anywhere." And then he enlarged on this theme: he digressed on the attacks on Jefferson for the purchase of Louisiana, recurred to Mr. Walker's work and made some reference to the Perkins claim; and when his plausible eloquence was exhausted he was excused, with no apparent realization by anybody but the secretary himself that, while answering fully as to the State Department's fund, he had omitted to notice the italicized clause that gave such troublesome scope to the question.

A comparison of Secretary Seward's statement before the committee with his statement to President Johnson hardly inspires confidence in the secretary's candor and veracity. If the most significant allegation in the president's memorandum, namely, that public men so high-placed as N. P. Banks and Thaddeus Stevens accepted money from Stoeckl, has no support save the memorandum itself, the case against them is anything but strong. If the implication is also that the sums given to these men came out of the fund distributed after August 1, 1868, it is hard to believe that Stevens ever got his share; for he was a very sick man on the first of August and he died on the 11th. After his death the principle *nil nisi bonum* operated to keep his name out of the discussion. On the other hand, Banks was very frequently mentioned; but both the wording of the resolution by which the investigation was authorized and the form of the committee's report indicate a purpose to avoid an inquisition into the transactions that might involve Banks or other congressmen. It is a singular fact that the testimony given by one witness is entirely omitted from the printed report of the evidence.¹ This omission may have been accidental; but the reader learns from the context that the lacking testi-


¹ See the examination of the witness Martin, Report, p. 32. Much is said here of the testimony of Mr. Tasistro; but no such testimony is printed.

mony is precisely that which tended to establish some relations between Banks and the Russian legation.

While it must be admitted that the memorandum does not prove any corruption in the cases of Banks and Stevens, it is hard to conceive that the statements about these men were concocted by Seward or Johnson or both with no basis whatever in actual fact. There are reasons for suspecting that the truth of the matter was probably something like this:

Minister Stoeckl was exceedingly delighted when the appropriation bill became law. His joy was expressed without reserve, and, as we have seen, it manifested itself in a large access of pecuniary generosity. Walker's fee was substantially increased; Forney's heroic virtue was subjected to temptation; the California newspaper man received his gratuity. Stoeckl's relations with Seward were very intimate; and it is quite possible that, in the far-reaching gratitude of the minister, he expressed a wish or a purpose to "do something" for Banks and Stevens, whose support of the appropriation had been so effective. This *ex post facto* project of Stoeckl might easily have taken on, in the conversation of September 6, the form and implications that Johnson embodied in the memorandum. Whether the project was ever carried into effect or not, it is impossible, with the available evidence, to say. Knowing, however, how dearly the secretary of state loved to be a dispenser of favors, and how lightly he regarded at times the proprieties of high political station, it would not be utterly wild to conjecture that, if either Banks or Stevens actually received a gift from Stoeckl, the agent through whom it was transmitted was no other than William H. Seward himself.

WM. A. DUNNING.



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